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Images of a Free Press. By Lee C. Bollinger.* Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991. Pp. xii, 209. $22.50.
If one tried to express the complexities and contradictions of American
constitutional government in a few simple, popular phrases, several choices
might leap to mind. The image of checks and balances, for example, conveys
the central idea that there is no single locus of authority; power is spread
among three federal branches, and between federal and state governments. The
image of equality is also central; under the Constitution, it is said, everybody
is just as good as everybody else, and however drastically this image crumbles
in practice, many Americans at least pay lip service to the ideal. But if the
average person on the street were to sum up our Constitution in a word, she
would probably say first that it is about democracy. If pressed, she might
explain that we citizens get to tell the government what to do, and if our
representatives are not listening, we replace them. Translating this simple
picture of the Constitution into more legal terms, one might say that "telling
the government what to do" is protected by the First Amendment, and the
people's right to replace an unresponsive government is secured by Articles I
and II, which establish term limitations and periodic elections for our Congress
and President.
To the extent that Americans have a picture of the Constitution in their
minds, then, free speech is probably a core part of the image. Lee Bollinger's
Images of a Free Press' invites us to focus on this word "image" when think-
ing about the First Amendment. Free speech is not merely a freedom, not
merely a structural denial of government authority over the individual, not
merely a seldom-exercised privilege of living in a democratic society-it is also
* Dean, University of Michigan Law School.
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a picture in most Americans' minds, an image of their government responsible
to its people. Can such simple pictures teach complex lessons? Bollinger tries
to persuade us that they can. He exhorts us to think more consciously and
constructively about what these images mean and how we might adapt them
to the needs of our collective future. His book only examines images of the
press, but his approach offers serious readers a chance to think about the
pictures we draw when imagining free speech and the Constitution itself.
Images of a Free Press reminds us that American law has two radically
different First Amendment regimes, each supported by mutually inconsistent
images of the roles government and the press play in a democratic society. The
"autonomy regime" is supported by cases that envision an independent print
press free of government control; the "regulatory regime" is supported by cases
that envision a broadcast media supervised by government in the public interest.
Part of Bollinger's thesis recapitulates an earlier article2 in which he argues
that this dichotomy of First Amendment regimes offers three choices: we can
shift to a complete autonomy system and deregulate the broadcasters, we can
shift to a complete regulation system and supervise the print press, or we can
keep the two regimes intact. Bollinger favors the last alternative for reasons set
forth in his book: new media will be most productive when stewarded into
maturity by government regulation, and the two press regimes produce benefits
that are not offered by an autonomy regime or regulatory regime alone.
The new aspects of the book deal with the power of legal images, and here
Bollinger seems interested in applying postmodernist critical theories to legal
problems. Bollinger argues that the twin images of the press accomplish certain
social effects-in other words, that they have normative power. After outlining
the two images, he deconstructs them to discover their deeper, hidden meanings.
The pragmatic or faint-hearted need not fear, however; Bollinger's book is
completely free of theoretical jargon, and any postmodern or deconstructionist
influences remain unacknowledged. Indeed, one flaw of the book is that after
offering the reader two conflicting images of the press, Bollinger fails to
synthesize them. A more committed postmodernist might have seized the
opportunity to draw her own picture of a free press, one that exploits the power
of images to shape popular thinking about the First Amendment. Despite this,
however, Bollinger's book offers readers sensitive and thought-provoking
insights on how to reform First Amendment and free press theory to serve the
needs of our democracy more fully.
Bollinger begins by sketching what he calls the "central image" of free
press in America: the image of the autonomous press.3 Under this image, the
government may not censor the press, license it, regulate the content of what
it publishes, or punish it for publishing something-except in a very narrow
2. Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation




set of circumstances, including fighting words, obscenity, or libel. Only an
autonomous press insures that the public will receive the information it needs
to exercise its sovereign power over the government. The government cannot
be trusted to regulate the press because it will always be tempted to muzzle its
critics under a regime of seditious libel laws. The Supreme Court has fostered
the image of an autonomous press in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan4 and its
progeny. Sullivan offers a theory of free press rights that protects newspapers
from state libel laws. Under this theory, even falsehoods are valuable in public
debate because strict use of the libel laws to punish falsehoods would discour-
age people from criticizing public officials. Bollinger notes that Sullivan offers
an image of the citizen as well: we are all prone to exaggeration, so the First
Amendment protects our right to engage in debate that is "uninhibited, robust
and wide-open"'5 without fear of subsequent punishment.
The book continues by showing how Sullivan's image of the press has been
extended beyond libel to protect the press from many challenges to the principle
of autonomy. The book reviews cases in which the press resisted public access
to editorial pages, special taxes on newsprint, and other threats. In these cases,
the Court also applied special doctrines to protect the freedom of the press:
government efforts to regulate or restrict the autonomy of the press demanded
heightened scrutiny; the government was required to demonstrate a significant
interest in laws that restrict the press; and such laws had to regulate speech in
the least intrusive way possible. In sum, Bollinger writes, "Since New York
Times v. Sullivan, therefore, there has arisen a jurisprudence of and for the
press."
Bollinger explores the image of the autonomous press in the second and
third chapters,7 outlining the harms of an autonomy regime and discussing how
the Court has acted to minimize these harms. The first cost of autonomy is that
the Court may underrate a countervailing social value-the cost of the pain
caused by defamatory statements, for example. Bollinger offers evidence that
the Court may have discounted such harms. To say that public figures assume
the risk of libel, he argues, begs the question, for the public is entitled to weigh
the aggregate costs of these harms against the value of potentially libelous
statements to public debate. The Court has privatized the harm of libel, ignoring
the public's interest in accurate information about the conduct of public figures
and the public's interest in assuring that qualified people will not be dissuaded
from entering a life of civil service.
The second cost of an autonomous press is even more troubling. Bollinger
points out that an autonomous press might actually hamper robust public
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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debate.' An autonomous press has the power to exclude or misrepresent points
of view it opposes; it can shift the tone of a debate to play on bias and preju-
dice; it can fuel ignorance by pandering to the public's demand for entertain-
ment; it can be restrained by the demands of advertisers; and it can become
concentrated in the hands of the wealthy and the powerful. Bollinger concludes
that the Court's central image of an autonomous press appears to ignore the
grave harm such a press poses to rich public debate, and he offers a provisional
explanation: any sensitive examination of the press would force the Court to
consider how the public reacts to the press-and the Court might have to
conclude that citizens could not be trusted to express a preference for a press
that fostered rich public debate. The Court might conclude, for example, that
the people preferred sitcoms to election coverage. Because the unelected Court
is vulnerable to accusations of paternalism and elitism, however, it lacks the
institutional legitimacy to criticize popular preferences for a certain type of
press.
Bollinger suggests that the Court has other means to curb potential abuses
of an autonomous press, means that rely on its institutional strengths instead
of its weaknesses. 9 Here one senses the possible influence of literary criticism
on Bollinger's analysis. He argues, roughly, that when the Court describes the
press, its very description becomes an account that has the power to remake
reality in its own image. More specifically, Court opinions have disciplined the
press by offering an image of how an independent press should function. By
celebrating an autonomous press, his argument runs, the Court has told the
press that it should behave as a servant of the public and a critic of government
and other established interests. The Court's writings on the free press extol, and
hence foster, an independence of mind essential to vigorous criticism of the
government. Further, because the press is dependent on the Court for protection,
the press has a strong incentive to heed the Court's expectations. At the end
of this otherwise sensitive discussion, however, Bollinger lapses into hyperbole:
"What appear on the surface to be theoretical justifications of the First Amend-
ment become, on further inspection, rhetorical stimulants designed to inspire
the press to particular behavior and to limit abuses from the freedom con-
ferred."10 This far-fetched conclusion disrupts his sophisticated picture of
Court and press interaction, but one can accept that the Court may have spurred
the press to higher standards while pursuing its primary task of articulating
coherent constitutional theory.
Bollinger unmasks the deceptive character of his central image of free press
by introducing a "secondary image": a broadcast media regulated in the public
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First Amendment analysis-and by content, a forbidden criterion under standard
First Amendment doctrine. Broadcasters cannot send their signals over the air
without government permission, and at times they have been forced to comply
with content-restricting rules such as the fairness doctrine and the equal time
rule. 12 The fairness doctrine has several prongs: it requires broadcasters to
devote air time to issues of public importance, requires coverage of such issues
to be fair and balanced, and gives public figures attacked by broadcast editorials
a right of free reply. The equal time rule demands that stations that give air
time to one candidate provide the same amount of time to other candidates for
the same office; it also requires stations to sell reasonable amounts of air time
to candidates for federal office. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has the power to enforce these rules by silencing broadcasters: those who
do not comply lose their license.
As before, Bollinger examines the Court's role in both supporting and
expounding the image of a regulated broadcast media.1 3 He concludes that the
Court has "celebrated" public regulation by viewing broadcasters as common
carriers who hold the airways in public trust."4 The Court justified this image
in its first case reviewing broadcast regulation, NBC v. United States,5 by
asserting that the broadcast media are different from printed news and therefore
demand different treatment. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC16 reaffirmed
this view by upholding the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine. The Court
wrote that "only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can
hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible communication
is to be had."17 Bollinger later challenges the Court's rationale for applying
different legal regimes to the broadcast and print media, s but here he focuses
not on the rationale, but instead on the image itself. Under the Court's "second-
ary image," communication networks are a kind of public trust, and regulation
fosters, not impedes, rich public debate on national issues.
One of the book's most interesting passages reviews three cases that
challenged applications of the FCC's fairness doctrine. The first case found that
West Virginia broadcasters did not devote fair air time to the local but contro-
versial issue of strip mining.' 9 The second granted an antismoking group a
right of free reply to cigarette commercials based on the theory that the ciga-
rette manufacturers had taken a position on a controversial public issue.20 The
third found that an NBC documentary had not given biased treatment to the
12. Pp. 63-66.
13. Pp. 66-84.
14. Pp. 71, 134.
15. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
16. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
17. Id. at 388, quoted at pp. 69-70.
18. Pp. 87-90.
19. In re Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976), discussed at pp. 74-76.
20. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969), discussed
at pp. 76-79.
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issue of pension reform.21 For Bollinger, these cases show that the fairness
doctrine forces courts to examine "how people think and the impact of a
medium on their thinking." Our regime of media regulation demands an
inquiry into the content of messages and their impact on an audience. This is
a fine point, and Bollinger reminds us that concern for the quality, as opposed
to the quantity, of public debate is utterly absent from the central image of the
autonomous press.
Bollinger goes on to suggest that the supposed differences between the
broadcast and print media are largely fictional.2 Newspapers seldom have any
competition, and they depend on national wire services just as television
affilliates depend on national news networks. Both industries are highly concen-
trated, and constrained by consumer and advertiser markets. These facts under-
mine the Court's rationale for regulating broadcasters, which emphasizes the
scarcity of outlets and the need to avoid a cacophony of conflicting signals. The
Court's unpersuasive justification should not exhaust our interest in broadcast
regulation, however, for Bollinger proposes an alternative: public regulation of
new media helps mold them into socially responsible institutions with journalis-
tic values. Bollinger shows that broadcasting was more regulated in its early
years, but that as it became more established, Court opinions began to treat it
more like "the press" and less like a common carrier. Cases reviewing cable
regulation attest to a similar pattern of early regulation followed by increasing
autonomy.'
As before, however, Bollinger is less concerned with the rationale offered
to support the two regimes of press regulation. He wants to focus the reader's
attention on the very existence of two regimes-on the two competing images
of the press in society. For Bollinger, these images cross-fertilize. Earlier in the
book, he suggests that Supreme Court opinions project an image of the press
that fosters responsible journalistic values. Similarly, he finds that the twin
images of regulated media and autonomous press have a generative interplay:
the regulated media has always stood as an intact, alternative theory at the
Court's disposal, ready to discipline the autonomous press if it ceased to serve
society. The print media in turn offered the newer, younger broadcast media
a model of critical independence.
The book's final two chapters25 argue that we need a new image of the
press's role in society: "The images we live with have real power over us,
including those provided by the courts. It is, therefore, crucial that courts begin
to develop a more realistic set of images than that incorporating a regime of
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seditious libel."' s Bollinger supports this aspiration with a m6lange of insights.
He defends the fairness doctrine, and he pleads for more appreciation of the
benefits conferred by regulating broadcasters. His most thoughtful observation,
however, concerns the quality of public discussion. For Bollinger, it is not
enough to focus on public access to media and the distorting effects of wealth
on public debate. He writes:
[E]ven in a world in which the press is entirely free and open to all
voices, with a perfect market in that sense, human nature would still
see to it that quality public debate and decision making would not rise
naturally to the surface but would, in all probability, need the buoyant
support of some form of collective action by citizens, involving public
institutions."
27
The conflicting images of free press in America, then, invite serious study of
how we can use our legal regime to raise the level of our public discourse. In
short, Bollinger believes the First Amendment should protect the substance as
well as the process of rich public debate. All this is thought-provoking, but it
leaves one feeling Bollinger ended his book a little abruptly. The reader is left
wishing he had continued by painting an image of the press that transcended
both "autonomy" and "regulation."
Bollinger's intricate effort to deconstruct images of the press never express-
es a simple but powerful intuition: the press is both a speaker and a conduit
for information. It has a dual nature in democratic society and thus its "image"
should reflect both these roles. The autonomy regime treats the press as a
speaker, a supercitizen with great persuasive power, while the regulation regime
treats the press as a conduit that simply pipes information out to the public. The
conflict is between active and passive perspectives: speaker versus courier.
Strangely, Bollinger never demystifies his analysis of cases and the images they
convey with a frank, functional discussion of this twin identity.
Yet "speaker versus courier" better explains the divergent traditions Bol-
linger identifies. Sullivan is about the value of rich public debate to democracy;
its analysis does not hang on a mistrust of government's capacity to regulate
the press. Rather, Sullivan treats the press as a group of intelligent, vocal
citizens who take a position on public issues. Justice Brennan's opinion does
not focus on seditious libel; it adopts instead an image offered by Alexander
Meiklejohn: the press in Sullivan resembles the leaders of a town meeting.'
If the press began behaving like the messenger of a self-interested committee
26. P. 145.
27. P. 139.
28. ALEXANDER MEIKIOHN, POLTICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
24-28 (Greenwood Press 1979) (1960). For Brennan's acceptance of the Meiklejohnian view, see William
. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1965); Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191.
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dealing in the back room, the logic of Sullivan would require that debate be
moved back onto the floor of the main chamber so more views could be
considered before the town took action. Conversely, RedLion sees broadcasters
as a glorified telephone exchange:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern-
ment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present
those views and voices which are representative of his community and
which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airways. 29
Red Lion's repeated use of the word "media" as opposed to "press" conveys
a powerful normative message. Usually Bollinger is sensitive to such distinc-
tions-he identifies the Court's failure to refer to broadcasters as "journalists,"
for example. Yet he misses "media," and so ignores the "courier" image.
What is a medium? It is a conduit, a wire, an energy wave-but not a speaker,
entitled to a voice in society and to protection under the Bill of Rights.
Bollinger may resist the image just offered in part because it shifts focus
away from his interest in the quality of public debate. Before we reform the
substance of public debate, however, we must develop a clear view of how
public debate works in practice. By ignoring "quality," the "speaker versus
courier" image does not focus on something so simple as streamlining the
ability of information to reach the public. Instead, it asks how information and
opinions pass between citizens as they consider public issues. It asks: "What
are the rules of conversation; who are the speakers; what are the mechanisms?"
Read with full attention to its image of free speech in democratic society,
Sullivan does not extol an autonomous press at the expense of such questions.
For clarity's sake, Bollinger should separate his interest in quality from his
desire to explore the structure and process of public debate. Maybe if the press
were like a series of single speakers who address a large, passive audience, we
would organize the interaction one way. If, on the other hand, the press were
like the vocal citizens in a town meeting, we would organize the interaction
differently. These sort of questions should probably precede any serious atten-
tion to regulating the quality of public discussion in America. A "speaker versus
courier" distinction could help readers think about the best process for regulat-
ing the press to foster democracy.
Bollinger accurately identifies autonomy as a central image of free press
theory-we want a press free from government control because speech betokens
our sovereignty as citizens. But he could have explored the normative content
of this image more successfully by posing an accessible central question: when
is the press a speaker, and what rules of order will insure public debate that




is "uninhibited, robust and wide open"? This would have reassured the reader
that Bollinger's two images need not always conflict, and that regulating the
press need not smack of censorship, nor raise the specter of the government
beginning to control what people say. This would also have provided a stronger
foundation for Bollinger's radical desire to bolster the quality of public speech
through regulation. Bollinger could have supplied those who wish to reform
media law with a palatable, practical image to seize while attempting to per-
suade others of the need for change.
In its final chapters, then, Images of a Free Press fails to offer a replace-
ment for the contradictory images of a free press developed by the Supreme
Court. It never constructs a clarifying image to unify or synthesize our two First
Amendment regimes. But Bollinger's reticence is both a weakness and a
strength, for it conceals a deeper wisdom: images of democratic government
derive their power from popular consensus, and one academic's theory is a poor
substitute for the kind of broad debate necessary to formulate a new, more
powerful image of free press and free speech in American society. This
thoughtful, understated book remains a call to come join the town meeting and
hammer out some new rules of order. Scholars and citizens alike would do well
to read Bollinger's book and accept his challenge.
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Black Hills White Justice: The Sioux Nation Versus the United States, 1775 to
the Present. By Edward Lazarus.* New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Pp. xvi,
486. $27.50.
For the Sioux Indians, the Black Hills of South Dakota meant many things,
both practical and spiritual. The hills "were a source of fresh mountain streams,
scarce lodgepoles for the tipis, and the medicine plants that healed the tribe."'
In addition, "[t]he Hills were a holy place, a place for vision quests, home to
Wakan Tanka, the Great Spirit, the sum of all that was powerful, sacred, and
full of mystery."2 The Sioux were not alone, however, in their desire for the
hills. White Americans also coveted the hills and the area surrounding them,
first as a way of passage to the West, then for their marvelously rich gold
reserves, and ultimately as a place to settle, raise livestock, and farm. Edward
Lazarus' Black Hills White Justice is the story of the struggle for control of the
Black Hills. The struggle began when the United States forcibly dispossessed
the Sioux, continued as the Sioux waged a sixty-year legal battle for compensa-
tion, and persists today as the Sioux Indians have rejected compensation and
demand the return of the hills themselves.
Lazarus recounts the early history of Sioux-United States relations with the
passion and indignation that it deserves. The first contact between the two
groups occurred in 1804, when Merriwether Lewis and William Clark arrived
in Sioux country to announce that the United States had acquired sovereignty
over Sioux territory through the Louisiana purchase. The explorers marked the
new relationship between the two peoples by wrapping a newborn Sioux infant
in an American flag, symbolically conferring American citizenship on the child.
At the same time, however, Lewis noted that the Sioux were "the vilest miscre-
ants of the savage race."3 The first contact foreshadowed later events, as the
government and people of the United States repeatedly combined ceremonial
respect for the Sioux people with complete disregard for their rights to land,
autonomy, and humanity.
In 1787, the Northwest Ordinance declared that "[t]he utmost good faith
shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent."4 In 1825, the United States
declared much of the western plains, including the entire Sioux territory,
* Former law clerk to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
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"Permanent Indian Country"5 and reserved it solely for the Indian peoples.
Soon thereafter thousands of pioneers stormed west for California gold in the
great migration of 1849, making tracks across Sioux territory and destroying
the bison hunting ground. Ten years later another horde of pioneers went for
gold, this time in Colorado. Unlike the first group, many of these pioneers
became settlers as well as explorers, choosing to homestead and making the
"Permanent Indian Country" increasingly less permanent and increasingly less
Indian.
The pressure for control of the land grew steadily on both sides until 1862,
when the Sioux wars erupted. During this period, "Indian hating spread like
a prairie fire.",6 "Receive no overtures of peace or submission from the Indi-
ans," remarked one general, "but attack and kill every male Indian over twelve
years of age."7 And kill they did. In Sand Creek, Colorado, local volunteers
attacked the camp of a peaceful Cheyenne band that the government had
promised safe quarter. They killed the men and "spent the better part of the day
tracking down and beating to death women and children who had managed to
escape the initial onslaught, then mutilated the corpses-beyond recognition."
Such fighting was consistent with the mood of the settlers, for as one frontier
newspaper noted, "There can be no permanent, lasting peace on the frontier till
these devils are exterminated." 9 The government's military leader for the
extermination project, General William Tecumsah Sherman, vowed to fight
"until at least ten Indians are dead for every white life lost," and proclaimed
he would not let "some old treaty" restrain him.'0
Notwithstanding Sherman's thirst for battle, some in government hoped for
a nonmilitary solution. They suggested a novel approach-the reservation
theory. In consolidating the Indians on large reservations, these reformers hoped
to save the Indians by teaching them to farm and raise livestock, by protecting
the Indians from the vengeance of the military and frontiersmen, and yet
simultaneously clearing the way for white settlers and expansion. This combina-
tion proved irresistible. As Lazarus notes: "The reservation system, which
would clear the lines of travel across the plains and guarantee uninterrupted
construction of the transcontinental railroads, was ideally suited to a nation that
yearned for expansion with honor. The trains would run; the wagons would roll;
a prairie of red souls would be saved."'"
The reservation dream was realized with the Treaty of 1868, which set
aside all of present-day South Dakota west of the Missouri River, including the
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of the land north and west of the reservation as "unceded Indian territory" and
granted the Sioux hunting rights on land south and west of the reservation."
Moreover, the government promised to supply food, schools, doctors, black-
smiths, teachers, "boss farmers," and administrative agents. 3 Finally, the treaty
required that no future land sales would be valid without the signature of three-
fourths of all adult Sioux males. In return, the United States requested peace
and a commitment that the Sioux remain within the boundaries of the reserva-
tion.
The 1868 treaty, which held out great promise for the Sioux, was short
lived. In response to battles between the Sioux and white settlers, General
Sherman demanded authority to take harsher measures against Sioux who
disobeyed his military edicts, whether or not his orders were consistent with
the treaty provisions. The government met his request by unilaterally renounc-
ing many of the treaty's provisions less than a year after negotiating them.
Moreover, the government de facto repudiated even those commitments that
it officially maintained by completely mismanaging the administration of the
promised food and supplies. Pressure on the government to amend the treaty
further intensified as a transcontinental railroad made its way toward Sioux
territory. Finally, whatever obligations the government might have felt the treaty
compelled ended abruptly in 1874 when an expedition led by General Custer
discovered gold in the Black Hills. As Lazarus concludes wryly, in light of
these cumulative pressures, "upholding the 1868 treaty was not a matter of rigid
principle.'
14
Lazarus writes that within a year of Custer's gold discovery, "the Grant
administration reached the conclusion, long thought inevitable by the miners,
that as a matter of practical and political necessity the hills had to be ac-
quired."'15 Although the law prohibited non-Sioux from entering the reserva-
tion, President Grant increased the pressure on the Sioux by secretly ordering
that "no further resistance sh[ould] be made to the miners going into [the Black
Hills].' 6 Similarly, General Sherman stated that he understood that if miners
desired to invade the Black Hills, the President and the Interior Department
would "wink at it."' 7 Even with miners streaming into the hills, however, the
government needed further measures to take full possession of the area. Since
a military crisis would have been sufficient to allow the Army to take action
against the Sioux, says Lazarus, the government "manufactured" one.'8 The
staged crises initially resulted in utter devastation for the United States Army,
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Custer and the Seventh Calvary. The nation responded to this military drubbing
instantly and viciously. Nebraska Senator Algernon Paddock introduced a bill
demanding extermination of the Indians. Schoolchildren swore to kill Sitting
Bull on sight. For its part, the government demanded that the Sioux give up
much of the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills, as well as all
their rights to the unceded Indian territory established by the Treaty of 1868.
The government maintained that refusing to sign this new treaty was not an
option. The nation "gave the Sioux the choice to die in battle, to die from
starvation, or to surrender everything they held of value."19 Knowing that they
could win a battle but not a war, the Sioux signed the treaty. Their beloved
Black Hills were gone.
Less than two decades after they lost the Black Hills the Sioux began the
battle to reclaim them. While the Sioux lost the hills on the battlefield and at
the negotiating table, they fought to win them back in the courtroom and the
legislature. As Lazarus explains, however, the first decades of litigation were
inauspicious. He attributes this failure to incompetent Sioux counsel. Ralph
Hoyt Case, the lead attorney for the Sioux from 1923 to 1956, was a "[p]atriot,
advocate, [and] honorary Sioux," but he was more "crusader" than "lawyer.'20
Case's written work led Lazarus to wonder "how a lawyer twenty years on the
case... could not produce better work," while his trial preparation drew the
conclusion that "[w]hatever Case was up to in the year preceding the trial, it
certainly did not involve the production of evidence." 2' In court, Case "ram-
bled," "wandered," and generally provided a picture of "sheer incompe-
tence." While Lazarus does not doubt Case's commitment to the Sioux
people and their Black Hills claim, he concludes that Case's consistent inability
to provide adequate lawyering almost cost the Sioux their entire case. After
over thirty years of litigating and losing, Case resigned.
Into the breach stepped Arthur Lazarus, the author's father. Arthur Lazarus
did not bring passion or a lifelong commitment to the cause of Indian justice
to the job. Indeed, he only took a position doing Indian law due to the limited
job opportunities for Jewish attorneys. What he lacked in passion, however, he
compensated for in intellect, analytic skill, and gifts for writing, oral argument,
and lobbying. The elder Lazarus quickly applied his "analytic and precise turn
of mind" and "clever hazel eyes" to the problem of reviving the moribund
Black Hills litigation.23 He and his associates embarked on a twenty-five year
journey to undo the damage done by Case and to try the Black Hills claim
properly. Their fight took them before the Court of Claims, the Indian Claims
Commission, the United States Congress, and ultimately the Supreme Court of
19. P. 90.
20. Pp. 149, 167.
21. P. 173, 194.
22. P. 194, 195.
23. P. 226, 249.
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the United States. Finally, on June 30, 1980, after almost sixty years of litigat-
ing and lobbying, the Supreme Court issued a final ruling. The Court agreed
with the Sioux attorneys that the government's confiscation of the Black Hills
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and required just compensation. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, held that the U.S. government's decision to
grab the Black Hills and expel the Sioux
effected a taking of tribal property, property which had been set aside
for the exclusive occupation of the Sioux .... That taking implied an
obligation on the part of the Government to make just compensation
to the Sioux Nation, and that obligation, including an award of interest,
must now, at last, be paid.2
Yet just as the Sioux had not lost the Black Hills forever through govern-
ment confiscation in 1877, they had not won the Black Hills with the Supreme
Court ruling in 1980. The Sioux had won compensation, but not the hills, and
for growing numbers of Sioux, monetary compensation was no compensation
at all. As Ramon Robideaux, the first Sioux to earn a law degree, put it, "The
Sacred Black Hills rightfully belong to the Sioux. [They are] not for sale."5
The movement to reject compensation and demand the return of the Black Hills
had its roots in the Indian rights movement of the late 1960's and early 1970's.
In a passage of typical grace and power, Lazarus writes:
Having witnessed the black civil rights movement and the fishing
rights protests of reservation Indians in the Northwest, hearing now the
angry and powerful rhetoric of a Stokely Carmichael or Malcolm X,
watching the rising tide of the movement against the Vietnam war,
many city Indians embraced the politics of militancy and united under
the banner of Red Power. Almost overnight, American Indians became
Native Americans, who vowed in strident terms to reclaim their rights
and heritages.2
For the new Native Americans, old responses such as the Black Hills
litigation were no longer acceptable. "Seeking compensation for the taking of
the Black Hills ... represented a capitulation to U.S. treaty breaking, a sellout
to white and capitalist notions that land and money were interchangeable, or,
more crassly, that the Sioux and their lands could be bought."27 In light of the
new Sioux agenda, it is not surprising that even before the Supreme Court heard
the case, conflicts arose with their attorneys who pressed forward with the
litigation-for-compensation strategy. While Lazarus' father had not been fired,
many Sioux were demanding that he be. When, shortly before the Supreme
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Court argument, Arthur Lazarus and his co-counsel, Marvin Sonosky, took a
trip to the reservation, they were confronted by a hostile crowd who assaulted
Sonosky and forced them to leave the reservation under police escort. Even as
the elder Lazarus prepared to step up to the lectern at the Supreme Court,
"[a]mong [the crowd] were many Sioux faces, none friendly to Sonosky and
Lazarus." 28 In spite of the wrath of his clients, Arthur Lazarus argued well
enough to win the largest Indian claims judgment in history. However, because
the Sioux rejected the monetary award, the only portion distributed was the
lawyers' fees-over $10 million. The rest of the $106 million award collects
interest in the United States Treasury while the Sioux continue their fight for
the Black Hills.
While no book can do everything well, Edward Lazarus' comes very close.
In the spirit of Simple Justice29 and Common Ground," Lazarus describes
the legal battle without losing sight of its participants. The result is a documen-
tary that reads like a novel. Trained in law, yet skilled in social history,
Lazarus' vivid prose and analytic precision bring both people and doctrine to
life. Lazarus writes with a combination of passion and reason that is likely to
win the hearts of those whose sentiments lie with the Sioux as well as the
minds of those uncommitted to the Sioux cause. At the same time, however,
the book is deeply, and perhaps inevitably, flawed because Lazarus is unfortu-
nately both historian and son, and that dilemma proves difficult to overcome.
As fine as the book is, the reader is left wondering what it might have been
had Lazarus not been bound by blood to the central figure.
Lazarus spends too much time, for example, discussing the brilliance of
his father and the incompetence of Case. He relies on anecdotal evidence to
support his conclusions regarding his father. For example, he says, "[a]s for
Lazarus's legal prowess, a long-time partner recalls how colleagues beheld him
with 'something approaching awe' for the 'singularly organized, all-encompass-
ing, and creative intelligence' that he brought to bear on legal problems.'' 31
Lazarus buttresses his conclusions regarding the relative merits of the two
attorneys by pointing out that Case consistently lost while Lazarus won. Yet
evidence in the book itself indicates that there might be other explanations for
the win-loss ratio. While Case did lose time and time again, so did the over-
whelming majority of lawyers who brought Indian claims during that period
of time. As Lazarus notes, during the years in which Case litigated, "the Court
of Claims had compiled an extensive record of rejecting tribal grievances. 32
The United States Supreme Court was similarly hostile during that era. After
28. P. 385.
29. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OFBROWNV. BOARD OFEDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
30. J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE
AMERICAN FAMILES (1985) (history of desegregation of Boston school system).
31. P. 389.
32. P. 208.
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the Court ruled against Arthur Lazarus in a case involving the Tuscarora
Indians, the author comments, "The argument and decision turned out to be a
disillusioning lesson in the elastic nature of legal rules when national priorities
or large sums of money are at issue."'33 Over time, however, the courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, became increasingly receptive to Indian claims. By
1980, when Lazarus' father appeared before the Court with the Black Hills
claim, it seems that, as a general matter, Native Americans "fared well."34
From these facts, it is possible to conclude that the changing nature of the
federal judiciary played a role in the increased success of the Sioux litigation
over time. Of course, the fact that the judiciary became more pro-Native
American does not mean that Case was not incompetent, or that the author's
father was not brilliant. But the relationship between a changing judiciary and
the prospects for success of the Sioux claim is a significant issue in its own
right, and one which this historian might have pursued had he been more
detached from the participants.
The relationship between the author and his father also obscures the critical
issue of the relationship between social protest and legislative action. Lazarus
tells the story of his father's lobbying efforts and how, along with his associates
and other attorneys, he won significant victories in Congress during the 1960's
and 1970's. For example, Lazarus writes, "At the urging of tribal attorneys such
as Sonosky and Lazarus, in 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act
.... 35 Lazarus' father is also given credit for two amendments to the Indian
Claims Commission Act,3L 6 which were critical to the Black Hills litigation.
We are told that the first victory, an amendment to the Indian Claims Commis-
sion (ICC) Act, came about because "Lazarus had engineered an unprecedented
legislative triumph., 37 Of the second victory, we learn that lobbying, letter
writing, and arm twisting by Arthur Lazarus and sympathetic Congressmen
meant that "[flor only the second time in thirty-two years, Congress amended
the ICC Act. Both times it did so to further a single case, the Black Hills
claim. 38 The legislative success story lacks any discussion of the role that
the Sioux themselves played through their tireless demonstrations, protests, and
civil disobedience. Although Lazarus describes the Native American civil rights
movement with care and detail and recognizes the role the movement may have
had on the passions and perspectives of those on the reservation, he does not
address the possibility that Sioux protest might have informed national policy.
For example, Lazarus says the Trail of Broken Tears, a nationwide trek to
Washington by members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) that resulted
33. P. 237.
34. P. 383.
35. P. 297; see also Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit 11, 82 Stat. 77 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)).
36. Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70).
37. P. 336. See Pub. L. No. 93-494, § 2, 88 Stat. 1499 (1974).
38. P. 365. See Pub. L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978).
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in a takeover of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), "changed nothing."39 The
nation soon forgot "the dramatic pictures of modem Indian warriors, makeshift
clubs in hand, standing guard outside the BIA, or of the gutted building they
left behind."'4 Perhaps Lazarus is correct, but it might have been worthwhile
for him to give some attention to the fact that three laws benefiting Native
Americans were passed during the same ten-year period in which Native
Americans were most actively pursuing dignity and equality.
Finally, Lazarus is the least objective and insightful when discussing
precisely the issue in which his father's role is most controversial. Describing
the conflict between the Sioux who demanded return of the Black Hills and his
father, who fought for compensation, Lazarus is too close to his subject to
render fair and proper treatment. Lazarus gives little attention to this important,
final, and ongoing, chapter of the story. The Sioux who oppose his father's bid
for compensation are presented as, at best, impractical dreamers not attuned to
the hard political realities of the American state, and at worst, as hapless
individuals whose only source of faith is their status as victims, a status they
refuse to alter by accepting compensation.
Lazarus' disagreement with those who continue to demand the return of
the hills is so significant that he glosses over his own evidence. Lazarus invokes
the names of the great Sioux leaders of the past, claiming that those who
demand the return of the hills have degraded their legacy. "All the old men now
long dead-Red Cloud and American Horse, Henry Standing Bear and Peter
Dillon-all the Sioux who for three generations had carried the Black Hills
claim in their hearts... had all sold out, according to the militants, or been
duped by fee-seeking white attorneys." 1 The militants were wrong though,
says Lazarus, for the great leaders had never dreamed of the Black Hills.
"These Sioux had never imagined that they might reclaim the Hills themselves
or that an independent Sioux nation might still exist. ' 42 History may not be
as unequivocal as Lazarus claims, however, for 200 pages earlier the following
statement appears about Ralph Case and the initiation of the Black Hills legal
claim: "Case was especially anxious to impress upon the Sioux that their legal
claim to the Hills merely entitled them to 'just compensation' ... not to the
land itself. He was worried that 'most of the Sioux have hoped that they might
regain the Black Hills.'m4 3 Perhaps, then, the venerated Sioux leaders of the
past would be proud, not ashamed, of the AIM militants of today.
As Lazarus knows, the final chapter of the Sioux battle for the Black Hills
has not yet been written. Only time will tell whether the Sioux dream of
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Edward Lazarus has provided a moving account of the story to date. Indeed,
Lazarus' greatest contribution of all may be to help make possible the day when
the Sioux get full justice for the centuries of oppression-when the Sioux get
their Black Hills.

